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Chapter 8: Nation and Reaction. 
 Spanish Conservative Nationalism and the Restoration Crisis 
On 11 September 1923, Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalists gathered in Barcelona 
to commemorate Catalonia’s national day and demanded home rule for their regions. 
During the course of the demonstration some chanted slogans against Spain and in favour 
of the Rifean rebels in Morocco, which led to violent clashes with Spanish nationalists 
and police forces. The street battle ended with 30 people injured. After the events, the 
military officers of the Barcelona garrison were fuming. For most of them this was the 
last straw of an escalating provocative offensive by separatists determined to destroy the 
Spanish nation. Noticing the high level of indignation of his colleagues, Captain General 
Miguel Primo de Rivera, who had been plotting against the constitutional government for 
months, decided to bring forward the date of the coup (originally scheduled for 15 
September). On the night of the 12-13 September Primo de Rivera declared martial law 
in Catalonia, told the king about the insurrection, asked other captain generals for support 
and launched his manifesto. In Madrid, a group of generals who had also been plotting 
against the government formed a provisional junta. On 14 September, Alfonso XIII 
returned from his holidays in San Sebastian, stated his support for the coup, dismissed the 
constitutional government and invited the Captain General of Catalonia to come to the 
Spanish capital. The following morning Primo de Rivera arrived in Madrid. After a brief 
meeting, the king named him head of a Military Directory with executive and legislative 
powers and dissolved parliament. The coup had succeeded.1
 In his manifesto to the nation, the Captain General of Catalonia justified his action 
against the constitutional government as the only way to save ‘the Fatherland from a 
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dishonourable end’.2 In his view, trade unionists, Catalan and Basque nationalists and 
incompetent civilian politicians had constantly threatened the patria since Spain lost the 
remnants of its empire to the USA in 1898. After a quarter of a century of continuous 
disasters and decadence, Primo de Rivera stated, the army had to intervene to avoid 
national disintegration. The unmistakable nationalist nature of the manifesto reflected the 
growing importance that Spanish patriotism had gained in the discourse of a variety of 
groups of the Right during the last years of the Restoration. Since the turn of the 20th
century, such groups elaborated a new nationalist discourse, as a response to the rapid 
and accelerating process of modernization that Spain was undergoing. As the political 
crisis of the Restoration deepened after the end of World War One, the nationalist and 
apocalyptic tones of the Right increased and many of its jingoist ideas found a fertile 
ground among military officers. 
 Contrary to the view of some scholars, this chapter argues that the last years of the 
Restoration were the key period in the ideological construction and social propagation of 
a modern conservative nationalism that would eventually constitute the bases of the 
primorriverista dictatorship.3 It is true that, unlike Italy with the Nationalist Association, 
first, and the Fascists, later, Spanish nationalism was not centred around a single party. 
Yet, as was the case in France, Spanish nationalism permeated a wide range of elites, 
political movements, institutions and the media from the beginning of the 20th century. 
This conservative nationalism was prominent in the discourse of political groups such as 
the Mauristas, the Liga Patriótica Española and the Asociación Católica Nacional de 
Propagandistas. These groups sought to regenerate conservative thought, became 
increasingly authoritarian in the years after the Great War and attempted to transform the 
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Restoration political system from the inside. But a renovated Spanish nationalism was not 
exclusive of those groups of an emerging ‘New Right’. A growing and renewed patriotic 
rhetoric is also to be found those years among the Traditionalists, who openly opposed 
the Restoration regime and remained on the fringes of the Liberal regime.4 Additionally, 
the pages of conservative newspapers, like El ABC and La Vanguardia, and large sectors 
of the army, were also to embrace ultranationalist concepts of Spain. This new patriotic 
agenda presented some variations from one group to another, but by the 1910s it certainly 
emphasized the three major components of Spanish conservative nationalism in the 20th
century, namely militarism, anti-Catalan and Basque nationalism, and the concept of 
Catholicism as the spiritual essence of the nation.
 The role of Catholicism is central to this chapter. Traditional historiography has 
argued that Catholicism hindered the development of a modern nationalism in the 20th
century. According to this line of interpretation, in Spain, the strong presence of religious 
postulates in the conservatives’ discourse necessarily hampered the development of a 
modern and solid nationalism.5 A stout allegiance to Rome, the argument goes, did not 
allow for the emergence of full-blown patriotism linked to the Spanish nation-state 
among different conservative groups. Furthermore, during the Restoration era the Vatican 
was at times reluctant to support the Spanish political regime. The Holy See had a history 
of confrontations with different Spanish governments throughout the 19th century and 
considered the Restoration settlement too liberal for its taste. Thus traditional 
historiography has claimed that the Vatican did not promote the identification of Spanish 
Catholics with the Restoration state, for it saw the parliamentary monarchy as a danger to 
ecclesiastical interests. The following pages show the compatibility of religion and 
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nationalism in the discourse of the Spanish Right. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates the 
full cooperation of the Catholic Church with the Spanish governments in the promotion 
of nation. In the last years of the Restoration, ecclesiastical leaders participated together 
with civil authorities in parades, opening of monuments, patriotic celebrations and all sort 
of commemorations of the nation, in an attempt to publicly endow the patria with sacred 
connotations opposed to those seeking to challenge the political system. Nation and 
reaction went hand in hand. 
 The chapter is divided into two parts. The first section analyses the discourse of 
the main groups that were to regenerate the message of the Right, namely Mauristas, 
Social Catholics, the Liga Patriótica Española and the Monarchist Leagues of Bilbao and 
Barcelona. It also focuses on the Traditionalists (Carlists and Catholic Integrists), groups 
on the fringes of the political system, which developed a highly nationalist discourse 
during the last years of the Restoration. The second part explores the official policies of 
mass nationalization implemented by the Conservative Party when in power. This section 
concentrates on the policies of education, the celebration of national holidays and the 
monuments built to incorporate the masses into the conservative nationalist project. 
Unlike the Carlists’, this project did not aim at transforming the political establishment, 
but rather sought to keep the status quo while preventing any further democratization of 
the Restoration regime.
The Reformulation of Conservative Spanish Nationalism 
During the month of April 1898, a wave of jingoism was felt throughout most of Spanish 
society. As the war with the United States approached, newspapers speculated on the 
possibility of a rapid Spanish victory, the urban masses patriotically gathered to support 
295
the struggle and political parties united in their defence of the military.6 By early July, the 
fleet lay at the bottom of the sea and Spain had lost the remains of her once great empire 
to the United States. The ‘Disaster’ of 1898, as it came to be known, signals a turning 
point in the development of modern Spanish nationalism. As in the Italian case after the 
defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians at Adowa (1896), the loss led to a crisis of national 
identity. An entire generation of intellectuals, the so-called ‘Generation of 1898’, devoted 
its work to solve the ‘problem of Spain’. Political groups presented diverse alternatives to 
‘regenerate’ the ‘sick’ nation. Disaffection with the nation-state became paramount. The 
lower classes radicalized and demanded deep social and political transformations, while 
Catalan regionalism and Basque nationalism increased their social support. Different 
groups on the Right reacted to these changes and embarked on a mission of national 
regeneration. 
 To be sure, it was Maurismo, the movement formed around the Conservative leader 
Antonio Maura, that represented the first real attempt to organize a modern political party 
and regenerate the country ‘from above’. In a speech in parliament in 1899, Maura had 
already warned of the need to undertake a ‘revolution from above’, in order to avoid a 
revolution ‘made in the streets’.7 From then on, Maura’s discourse would be one of 
national regeneration and active counterrevolution. Deeply influenced by the thought of 
his friend Charles Maurras, Maura’s idea of Spain was essentially based on the 
conservative canon of the nation elaborated in the 19th century. In this canon, monarchy 
and Catholicism were much emphasized as the keystones of the fatherland. To preclude 
revolution from below, the Maurista movement took to the streets in the second decade 
of the 20th century. The aim was to mobilize what was seen as the apolitical middle 
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classes, the so-called ‘neutral mass’, and to create an educated ‘citizenry’ to change the 
system from within. In other words, Maurismo intended to attract the middle classes 
hitherto not involved in the oligarchic system to transform the Restoration and ultimately 
combat the Left. Achieving these goals involved the creation of modern propaganda 
machinery, the organization of mass rallies, the formation of a Maurista Youth and the 
creation of Maurista Centres all around Spain, something until then unknown to the 
monarchist parties. With a propaganda machine ready, a nationalist rhetoric, and a 
paternalistic approach to the ‘social question’, Maurismo felt confident to fight the 
working-class parties on their home ground. Since early 1915, Mauristas opened ‘social 
centres’ in working class neighbourhoods to compete with Socialist, Anarchist and 
Republican educational and cultural centres. The aim was to ‘educate’ the lower classes 
in patriotic, Catholic, corporative, and monarchist values and separate the proletariat from 
the left-wing parties.8
 The fact that the first Spanish attempts to form fascist-type groups emerged around 
the Mauristas should not come as a surprise. Since World War One, an important sector 
of Maurismo, and particularly the Maurista Youth, was convinced that parliamentary 
politics had failed and advocated a strong government to save the nation. For many 
Mauristas the only way to stop the Left was by physical confrontation, either via 
bourgeois militias or military-led repression. As early as March 1919, the Maurista daily
La Acción had called for a military dictatorship.9 When Mussolini gained power in Italy 
in October 1922, La Acción enthusiastically welcomed fascism as the solution to sweep 
away the political parties, and called Spaniards to follow the Italian example and form a 
national legion. Two months later, in December 1922, La Palabra, an ultranationalist 
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paper was launched in Barcelona. It called for the middle classes to save the Spanish 
nation and claimed it was time to ‘smash the separatist slugs’ in Catalonia.10 At the very 
same time, the Maurista Joaquín Santos Ecay, the director of La Acción, Manuel Delgado 
Barreto, and the president of Spanish Employers’ Confederation (an extension of the 
Barcelona Employers’ Federation), Tomás Benet, attempted to form the first fascist 
organization around the newspaper La Camisa Negra in Madrid.11 In the summer of 
1923, another pro-fascist organization, La Traza, was founded by a group of army 
officers in Barcelona. The new party blamed politicians for the loss of the colonies, the 
Moroccan disaster of 1921, and the caciques’ destruction of the ‘popular will’, which was 
leading the fatherland to internal disintegration. In their foundational manifesto, La Traza
called for a ‘sacred union of Spaniards’, beyond their ‘monarchic or republican, 
aristocratic or democratic’ ideas, to save the nation and suggested violence against the 
internal enemies of the fatherland was a valid option to redeem Spain.12 Although the 
lives of La Camisa Negra, La Palabra and La Traza were ephemeral, their appearance 
proves that the ground was fertile for the growth of authoritarian nationalist alternatives 
to the Restoration. If they did not develop further it was because the military dictatorship, 
an option much wanted by the Mauristas, albeit not by Maura himself, was to integrate 
all these extreme-right groups into the regime of Primo de Rivera. 
 The growth of Spanish nationalism can also be detected in the formation of new 
coalitions of members of the governmental parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, to 
confront regional nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In Catalonia, the 
offensive was led by the former Liberal Alfonso Sala. In early 1919, he founded the 
Unión Monárquica Nacional (UMN), a coalition that attracted some important members 
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of Catalan high society specifically aiming to combat the Lliga Regionalista. This 
reaction of the monarchist parties was not accidental. First, the increasing pressure of the 
democratic forces and the reorganization of the trade-union movement after World War 
One hardened the discourse of the dynastic parties. Secondly, the international 
recognition of the right of self-determination of national minorities after the Great War 
fuelled the emergence of more radical Catalanist opinions which pushed for full ‘home 
rule’. The moderate Lliga also launched a campaign to gain political autonomy for 
Catalonia. On 20 November 1918, just nine days after the armistice, a group of delegates 
of the Mancomunitat (the regional institution controlled by the Lliga), handed a proposal 
to the Spanish Prime Minister, Manuel García Prieto, demanding Catalan home rule. 
Against home rule, the UMN proposed monarchism, corporatism and regionalism - the 
latter understood in the Maurista sense of local and regional regeneration of the whole of 
Spain.13 The anti-catalanism of the UMN initially did the trick. The new group 
galvanized españolista Liberals and Conservatives, gathered support from some sectors 
of the middle classes, and improved the electoral results of the monarchists in 
Catalonia.14
 In November 1918, just a couple of months before the formation of the UMN, 
Barcelona also witnessed the emergence of the Liga Patriótica Española (LPE). This 
league was formed by a conglomerate of Mauristas, republican lerrouxistas, Carlists and 
military officers. The LPE embodied the most populist branch of Spanish nationalism and 
specialized in street fighting and shootings of radical catalanists. It acted as the 
españolista ‘shock troops’ versus the ‘separatists’ and tried to gain mass support of the 
lower classes via meetings, public lectures and a series of publications characterized by a 
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highly demagogic rhetoric. Interestingly, the leadership of the LPE recommended its 
members vote indistinctively for the UMN and for republican candidates, which 
demonstrates that the right-left cleavage was much less significant than the españolista-
catalanista one. By the spring of 1919 the LPE claimed it had thousands of members and, 
even if the exact figure is very difficult to reckon, the fact remains that Spanish 
nationalism in Barcelona was a cross-class phenomenon that went far beyond the small 
clique formed by the monarchist elites.15
 The situation was not different in the Basque Country. In January 1919, 
Conservatives, Liberals, and Mauristas met in the Maurista Circle of Bilbao and formed 
the Liga de Acción Monárquica to fight ‘separatism’. In the same years, the Bilbao daily 
El Pueblo Vasco gathered an important number of intellectuals, who first formulated an 
ultra-nationalist notion of Spain. Among these writers and politicians were Ramiro de 
Maeztu, Victor Pradera, José Calvo Sotelo, Eduardo Aunós, Rafael Sánchez Mazas, and 
Count Rodezno.16 With the exception of Sánchez Mazas, all of them were later to 
collaborate, in one way or the other, with the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera. 
Although regional nationalism was not as strong as in Catalonia, the logic behind the 
Liga de Acción Monárquica was the same as in the UMN: a defensive reaction of 
Spanish nationalism to fight the challenges from regional nationalists. In the case of the 
Basque Country, the Liga de Acción Monárquica formed an electoral alliance with the 
Socialists and agreed to present a series of candidates in the working-class areas of 
Vizcaya.17 As in Catalonia, the alliance meant breaching the gap between the Right and 
the moderate Left, in the name of protecting the Spanish nation from the regional 
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nationalists’ threat. The immediate outcome was the consolidation of Spanish nationalism 
in Barcelona and Bilbao, with the monarchist parties increasing their votes in both cities. 
 While Maurismo and the unions of dynastic parties were born in the big cities, 
another conservative movement proposing national regeneration that was to have a key 
influence in the ideological and political arrangement of Primo de Rivera’s Dictatorship 
found its strength in the towns and villages of Old Castile and the northern provinces. 
Since the publication in 1891 of Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, the interest of the 
Catholic hierarchy in the social situation of the lower classes had increased.18 The intense 
diffusion of Social-Catholic doctrines in the press, congresses, and collective pilgrimages 
was complemented in fin-de-siècle Spain with the opening of Catholic centres and, 
eventually, with the creation of Catholic trade unions in order to deal with the ‘social 
question’. As left-wing ideas spread throughout rural Spain, the Catholic Church 
launched a multiple-front offensive seeking a complete ‘re-clericalization of society’.19
 This process of ‘re-clericalization of society’ was a European phenomenon. As 
secularization advanced in the last years of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th
century, French, Austrian, Belgian and Italian Catholics fostered the principles of Social 
Catholicism to attract the lower classes to the Church’s agenda.20 In Spain clericalism 
grew intensively at the beginning of the 20th century too. Partially as a reaction to the 
anti-clericalism showed by the popular classes and liberal intellectuals during Tragic 
Week, the Church encouraged the creation of a series of new Catholic agencies.21 Acción 
Católica grew subsequently under the umbrella of the ecclesiastical authorities and 
developed as a modern association with different sections, including women, youth, trade 
unions and education.22 Fully aware of the importance of the media and up-to-date 
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propaganda, the Jesuit Ángel Ayala founded the Asociación Católica Nacional de 
Propagandistas (National Catholic Association of Propagandists - ACNP) in 1909. The 
Propagandists’ views were heavily indebted to the historic Romanticism and Neo-
Thomist thought that had framed the 19th-century conservative canon of Spain. Following 
the ideas of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Ángel 
Herrera, the Propagandists’ leader, considered nations to be the work of God in History. 
In his view, Spain was a ‘moral unity’ historically framed by the Monarchy and the 
Church under providential supervision. Equally, Herrera considered liberal democracy 
not to suit Spain. First, because sovereignty was believed to lie ultimately in God, and, 
second, due to the fact that Spain’s social and territorial disparities were thought too great 
to implement a real universal suffrage without dangers. As an alternative, the 
Propagandists defended an ‘organic democracy’ based on the family, municipalities and 
corporations that would eventually rejuvenate ‘the people’s sap’.23 In other words, 
Catholicism, a hierarchical notion of society and populism steeped the Propagandists’ 
biological concept of the Spanish nation. 
 From the beginning, the ACNP realized the importance of propaganda to obtain 
Catholics’ social and doctrinal cohesion. The famous ‘Propaganda Campaigns’ 
orchestrated by the ACNP mouthpiece, El Debate, sought to indoctrinate and mobilize 
followers in a militant Social Catholicism in an unprecedented manner. In addition, 
Social Catholics created trade unions and Centres of Social Defence to compete with the 
Left, though with very limited success.24 In fact, it was in the rural areas of Old Castile, 
Navarre and Aragon where Catholic propaganda paid off. The diverse agrarian unions 
created during the first years of the Great War finally came together in 1917 and formed 
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the Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria (National Catholic Agrarian Confederation 
- CNCA). A genuine interclass organization, the CNCA was made up of smallholders and 
directed by big landowners and focused on halting the advance of leftist ideas in the 
countryside.25 It was no coincidence that one of the first groups to promote the creation of 
an official primorriverista party, what eventually became the Unión Patriótica (Patriotic 
Union) in 1924, emerged from this social basis of Castilian militant Catholics. 
 In fact, by 1924 many members of the ACNP had previous experience in organizing 
a political party. As the demands for a democratization of the Restoration grew 
dramatically from 1917 onwards, the Social Catholics became increasingly aware of the 
need to change the system. In Zaragoza, Valencia and Sevilla, the so-called Catholic 
Leagues were formed to run in the elections against the dynastic parties. These leagues 
obtained fairly decent electoral results and, backed by the ACNP, became the kernel of 
the Partido Social Popular (Popular Social Party-PSP) in December 1922. Seeking to 
unite the different factions of the Spanish Right, the PSP managed to attract not only 
many Propagandists, such as José María Gil Robles, but also Traditionalists, like Victor 
Pradera, and Mauristas, like Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo. Together with an increasing state 
intervention to regulate the economy, the party proclaimed the need for radical changes, 
including the creation of a corporatist state, the reform of the 1876 Constitution, and the 
end of caciquismo.26 During its short life, the PSP distinguished itself for its anti-liberal 
rhetoric, its message of national regeneration and its attacks on a parliamentary system 
which was depicted as obsolete and corrupt.27 Not surprisingly, most of the PSP leaders 
joined the Unión Patriótica in 1924.28
303
 Changes also occurred in those reactionary groups that openly opposed the 
Restoration political establishment. After 1898, Carlists and Catholic Integrists tried to 
retain their customary influence in the areas of Navarre, the Basque Country and 
Catalonia. However, political unity amongst the Traditionalist groups was never achieved 
during the Restoration. Quite the contrary, in 1919 a major split in the Carlists ranks 
occurred, when the party’s main ideologue, Juan Vázquez de Mella, walked out to form 
the Traditionalist Party. Despite the schism, or perhaps because of it, ideologues such as 
Vázquez de Mella, Salvador Minguijón and Victor Pradera sought to revitalize Carlist 
doctrine during the first decades of the 20th century, by incorporating ideas from thinkers 
outside Spanish Traditionalism such as Charles Maurras and Joaquín Costa. This new 
Traditionalism focused on social questions in an attempt to gain mass political support 
and simultaneously sought to attract the most conservative political and ecclesiastical 
forces of the Alfonsine regime. Thus Traditionalists intensified their propaganda 
campaigns, participated in mass pilgrimages and even opened social centres for workers 
in Barcelona and Bilbao.29
 At the turn of the century, Traditionalists accentuated the patriotic tones of their 
political discourse in response to the emergence of Basque nationalism and Catalan 
regionalism. These movements competed with Traditionalism for a similar political 
market and seriously eroded Carlist popular support in Catalonia and the Basque 
provinces.30 Like Basque nationalists, Traditionalists fiercely defended the fueros (the 
medieval regional and local charters and statutes) and proposed a decentralized Spain 
based on pre-liberal laws. However, it is also important to note that this conception of the 
nation, for all its emphasis on regional liberties, did not preclude an imperial idea of 
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Spain. After all, the Carlists argued that Spain had created her world empire in the 16th
century, while maintaining the internal division of her various component parts. Since the 
1890s, all traditionalist factions ardently supported the Spanish struggle in the colonies. 
The military humiliation of 1898 was no discouragement: just three months after the 
defeat in Cuba, the Catholic Integrist daily El Siglo Futuro demanded the creation of a 
Spanish colony in Morocco.31 Soon after the intervention in Northern Africa was 
accomplished, in 1911 Vázquez de Mella called for the revocation of the international 
agreements with France and Great Britain in order to strengthen the Spanish position in 
the Moroccan protectorate. According to this logic, if Spain was to have a ‘moral empire’ 
over the Hispanic American countries as Vázquez de Mella wished, she needed to expand 
further into Morocco.32 Territorial gains were thus linked to ‘spiritual expansion’ in the 
imperial destiny traditionalists foresaw for Spain. The beginning of World War One did 
nothing to placate Vázquez de Mella’s imperial desires. In his book El ideal de España
(1915), he explicitly declared himself an imperialist and insisted on the need to claim 
Spanish total sovereignty over the Straits of Gibraltar, a federation with Portugal (the 
Spanish irredenta), and a loose union with the Spanish American republics which would 
adopt a common foreign policy under Spanish direction.33
 This Pan-Hispanismo, which Vázquez de Mella confessed should imitate 
aggressive Pan-Germanism, was not without roots in the Spanish Right. Hispanismo, the 
belief that Spaniards and Spanish Americans are members of the same ‘race’, had been 
an essential element in the discourse of Spanish politicians since the late 19th century.34
Both the Right and the Left had used the idea of a transatlantic spiritual community as an 
external projection of the Spanish nation. On the Right, Menéndez Pelayo had framed the 
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intellectual bases of Hispanismo during the 1890s, stressing the Catholic, linguistic, and 
cultural ties between Spain and its former colonies. After the loss of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico, this conservative Hispanismo gained a new impulse and a wider audience with the 
writings of Julián Juderías and José María Salaverría, who emphasized the Spanish 
concept of mission in America. The most popular work of these writers was Juderías’ La 
Leyenda Negra, a book acclaimed by both press and public. A disciple of Menéndez 
Pelayo, Juderías denounced foreign powers for inventing the ‘Black Legend’ to diminish 
Spanish influence in the world and complained of the positive reception this 
interpretation of history had had amongst Spaniards themselves.35
 This new drive towards conservative Hispanismo has to be understood, first of all, 
as an optimistic nationalist response against the pessimism that invaded regenerationist 
writers of the Generation of 1898. A good example of this patriotic optimism can be 
found in the writings of Salaverría, which constantly attacked the negative image of 
Spain portrayed by the artists of the Generation of 1898 and those foreigners that had 
invented the Black Legend. To overcome this ‘masochism’ that in Salaverría’s view 
many Spaniards were suffering, the Basque journalist proposed the creation of ‘a new 
Spaniard’ proud of the nation’s imperial history, advocated a rapprochement with the 
Spanish American countries and supported the occupation of the Rif in northern Africa.36
Secondly, the imperial rhetoric and the promotion of Hispanismo have to be considered 
as a reaction against regional nationalism. Conservative newspapers like El ABC, El 
Debate and La Vanguardia developed a deep anti-regional nationalist discourse in which 
the imperial past played the positive pole versus the ‘mutilated’ Spain wanted by Catalan 
and Basque nationalists.37 The growth of regional nationalism at the beginning of the 20th
306
century encouraged Spanish nationalists to deploy the concept of Hispanismo, which 
increased the sense of unity of the ‘Spanish race’ and implied the negation of Catalan and 
Basque nationalists’ claims.38
 There can be no doubt that in the last years of the Restoration a new authoritarian 
Right emerged in the political arena, which modernised conservatism by turning 
nationalism into a key element of its discourse. It strengthened conservatism’s Catholic, 
imperial, corporative and anti-democratic characteristics and incorporated new features 
such as radical militarism and anti-regional nationalism. As in other European countries, 
the New Right showed a genuine will to gain mass support but in Spain, despite all its 
organizational and propagandist efforts, it failed both to reform the Restoration regime 
and to attract great popular backing. The regime simply proved too resilient to the 
challenges of the New Right and the Traditionalists and the Restoration was able to keep 
the caciquil system going. By 1923 the authoritarian route of the military dictatorship 
was welcomed by all the New Right groups. They hoped the army would impose on the 
masses their authoritarian view of Spain and implement their political agendas. It was 
something of an acknowledgement of their own failure to rally mass support. 
A New Spanish Nationalism in a State of Siege 
The emergence of the New Right and the incorporation of nationalism as one way of 
coping politically with mass mobilization was the reflection of a changing society. 
During the first two decades of the 20th century social and economic transformations 
accelerated and the state was partially modernized. These changes were to have a direct 
impact on the process of nation-building, to the extent that during this period the 
complete nationalization of the Spanish political and cultural life was accomplished. In 
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other words, these were the years when the nation, and not the region or the town, 
became dominant in the field of social and political preoccupations.39
 To begin with, the loss of the colonies had the effect of increasing the integration 
of the national market. The Catalan textile industry lost its profitable market in Cuba and 
soon sought to gain new customers inside Spain. The political pressures of the Catalan 
bourgeoisie in Madrid proved fruitful and Spain significantly raised its already high 
tariffs to protect its products, which in turn led to the growth of national markets. 
Secondly, during the two decades that followed 1898, the system of national education 
developed, urbanization proceeded and the transport system was enlarged, increasing the 
mobility of the population within Spain. On top of this, illiteracy was severely reduced, 
although it still remained high by Western European standards, and mass press expanded 
creating a national market and invigorating the idea of an imagined national community. 
 Some of the state institutions also improved their performance as agents in the 
process of nation-building. Newly regulated, the public administration grew significantly 
in the first two decades of the 20th century, and civil servants, such as magistrates and 
functionaries, became more influential in provincial towns and villages. More to the 
point, the liberal state attempted to develop a competent national education system, which 
would include the entire population. Led by proposals of educational and social 
regeneration, the Ministry of Public Instruction was created in 1900, and a series of 
official institutions, such as the Escuela de Estudios Superiores de Magisterio (1909), the 
Centro de Estudios Históricos (1910), the Instituto-Escuela (1918), followed. In addition, 
a massive corpus of legislation regulated state educational intervention, which led to 
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serious improvements, especially in primary education, and confirmed public instruction 
as the agent of controlled social modernization.40
 This state intervention has to be understood not only as an attempt to improve the 
appalling illiteracy rates, but also as a conscious means of nationalizing the masses in 
bourgeois values. As a Royal Decree plainly put it in October 1911, the curricula for 
adult education sought to put ‘even more emphasis [than in primary education] on the 
formation of Fatherland loving citizens […] respectful of the Law, Property, and other 
citizens’.41 It is worth observing here that in this role of nationalization via education, 
both Conservative and Liberal governments played a key part. For all their rhetoric on the 
right of the Church to educate without state interference, the Conservatives under Maura 
promoted the role of state-controlled education and imposed compulsory universal 
primary schooling in 1909. Moreover, they were fully aware of the need to ‘produce’ a 
new patriotic youth that would ‘place love for the Fatherland beyond all interest and 
conveniences’.42 To achieve a complete ‘national pedagogy’, the Maurista Minister of 
Education César Silió argued, it was necessary to fight all those ‘humanitarian, pacifist, 
anti-militarist, and anti-patriotic’ doctrines taught in schools. He claimed these ideas were 
merely a ‘hypocritical cover’ of the Left that sought to ‘destroy those armed 
organizations that impeded the triumph of revolution’.43 Nationalization went hand in 
hand with counterrevolution. No wonder that when the Mauristas were in power several 
governmental initiatives aimed to transmit nationalist values. In September 1921, for 
instance, Silió created a patriotic prize awarded to the children’s book that most inspired 
love for the nation. The following month, a Royal Order stated that there must be a 
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portrait of Alfonso XIII, ‘as the head of the power that represented the unity of the 
Fatherland’, in a visible place in all public schools.44
 Not all state agencies were to improve their role in the process of mass 
nationalization. The army proved unable to be a competent institution in this respect in 
the first decades of the 20th century. As shown above, the mounting military intervention 
in politics and the steady use of the army in social repression did nothing but increase 
popular anti-militarism throughout the period 1898-1923. Neither did the continuity of 
the unfair conscription system improve matters. In spite of the legislation reducing 
monetary redemptions introduced by the Liberal Prime Minister José Canalejas in 1911, 
the system remained basically unchanged until 1921, and so did the understandable 
alienation of the popular classes from the army. Furthermore, in some areas of the 
countryside, the lower-classes’ contempt for the armed forces was emphasized by the 
actions of the Civil Guard, a militarized force created to defend proprietors’ interests in 
rural districts.45
 Nevertheless, the army was to play a crucial role in the regeneration of Spanish 
nationalism. A new version of Spanish nationalism came out of the military barracks at 
the turn of the century. This nationalism aimed to transform the nation-state and 
combined the requirement of modernization with conservative postulates.46 After 1898, 
professional officers openly advocated modernizing the nation via an authoritarian 
state.47 In their view, Spain needed a strong economy, a regimented society, and an up-to-
date army ready for new imperialist expansions to solve the post-colonial crisis. To 
achieve these aims the military demanded internal state reforms, including gearing 
industry towards arms production, a better educational system, an honest public 
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administration and restructuring the state-Catholic Church relationship.48 For the military, 
these transformations could not be carried out by the inefficient two-party system of the 
Restoration. They would rather require a strong government led by a general and not 
subordinated to parliamentary control. 
 The army not only felt it was the guarantor of the nation state but, moreover, saw 
itself as the interpreter of the popular will.49 In a corrupt political system in which male 
universal suffrage was little more than a charade, army officers often presented 
themselves as the real voice of the masses. Despite the decline of left-wing republican 
officers and the clear turn rightwards of the army since 1898, the rhetoric of populism 
remained well into the 20th century.50 However, this populism should not lead us to 
consider the military as the champions of democratic reforms. Almost invariably, the 
army sided with the Restoration civilian elites and was steadily used for internal 
repression. In reality, there was nothing democratic in this populist rhetoric. Scorn for the 
working classes was manifest in the military press and most officials feared the inclusion 
of the masses in the political arena. When using the populist discourse the army was 
indeed appealing to certain sectors of the population, mostly the middle-classes, or, to put 
it in military terms, ‘the healthy segments’ of society.51 Moreover, this new military 
nationalism shared many of the myths of the New Right. It saw in the martial spirit of the 
reconquista, the colonization of America, the fight against Protestants, and the ‘War of 
Independence’ the real ‘soul’ of the nation.52
 Ideologically, military nationalism gained momentum after 1898 due to the growing 
strength of Catalan regionalism and, to a lesser extent, Basque nationalism, as well as the 
latent anti-militarism of the working class. In defining itself as the repository of the 
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quintessential qualities of the fatherland, the army considered criticism of the military as 
an attack on the patria and regional nationalism as mere treason to the nation. According 
to this logic, political violence to punish enemies of national unity became a patriotic 
duty.53 In 1902, on three different occasions, officers attacked Catalan and Basque 
nationalist demonstrators.54 On the evening of 25 November 1905, after a satirical 
cartoon mocking the army appeared in the magazine Cu-Cut!, junior officers assaulted 
the editorial offices of the publication and then moved on to destroy the plant of the 
Catalanist newspaper La Veu de Catalunya. 
 The reactions to the assault showed how deep anti-Catalanist sentiments were in 
many sectors of the establishment. The action was applauded almost unanimously in 
garrisons throughout Spain, crowds of officers gathered at stations to greet military 
delegates sent to Catalonia, while junior officers in Madrid and Barcelona prepared an 
ultimatum for the king requiring action against the Catalanists and the closure of the 
Cortes. The officers also formed commissions and demanded all crimes against the army, 
the nation, and the state to be tried by military tribunals. As had been the norm in the 
past, the government took no action against the aggressors. On the contrary, on 29 
November 1905, it declared martial law in Barcelona, enforced the closure of 
newspapers, and arrested Catalanist sympathizers.55 In March 1906, the bill for the 
Repression of Crimes against the Fatherland and the Army (popularly known as the Law 
of Jurisdictions) was passed in Parliament with the support of Liberals and 
Conservatives. The new law was drafted by the Liberal government of Segismundo 
Moret and, although it retained offences against the nation and the state under civilian 
jurisdiction, it allowed military jurisdiction over verbal and written offences against the 
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army.56 The message to the military officers was clear: political violence and 
insubordination paid off in the short term. 
 If the Law of Jurisdictions confirmed the military belief that the army was the only 
genuine guardian of the fatherland and made official the military idea of Spain, the 
consequences in the long term proved to be disastrous. Republicans, Socialists and 
Carlists opposed the new legislation and its repeal became central to the political debate. 
In Catalonia, Solidaritat Catalana gathered Carlists, Republicans and Catalanists in a 
political alliance whose main goals were the abolition of the Law of Jurisdictions and the 
creation of Catalan regional institutions. The action-reaction spiral set off by the Cu-cut! 
affair seems clear: the military gained even more control of the state apparatus and 
regionalism gained more social support. 
 Subsequent crises only widened the gap between the military and the popular 
classes. When in 1909 an anti-war demonstration sparked off the events of Tragic Week 
in Barcelona, another episode of the action-reaction spiral was set in motion.57 The 
working class challenge to the imperial adventure ‘confirmed’ to the military that leftist 
ideologies worked against ‘national grandeur’. In turn, the brutal repression ordered by 
the Maura government and executed by the army logically amplified the bitterness and 
mistrust of the working class towards the military. During the period 1917-20 this very 
same pattern was to be repeated on a regular basis. What began as a military revolt to 
defend the army’s privileges in 1917 with the formation of the Juntas Militares de 
Defensa of junior officers ended up as harsh repression of the working class, military 
control of public services and continual declarations of martial law between 1919 and 
1922. Obviously, these actions only radicalized popular anti-militarism, while 
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contributing to the strengthening of conservative military mentality. Moreover, after the 
‘Disaster of Annual’ (1921) and the abolition of the Juntas (1922), the army adopted a 
unified stand in the face of social tensions and peripheral nationalism, which was to 
crystallize in Primo de Rivera’s coup in September 1923.58 It is hardly surprising that the 
day after the united demonstration of Catalan, Basque, and Galician nationalists in 
Barcelona on 11 September 1923, the military press complained of the ‘separatist riff-
raff’ and demanded the strict enforcement of the laws of crimes against the fatherland. ‘If 
impunity continued, good Spaniards should intervene to correct such grievances’, the 
military threatened.59 The following day, the captain general of Catalonia launched a 
coup. In his manifesto, Primo de Rivera justified his action claiming the nation had to be 
saved from the ‘shameless separatist propaganda’ and from the ‘impunity of Communist 
propaganda’. The military press unanimously welcomed the coup.60
 One of the reasons why military officers felt alienated from the constitutional 
system was because they deemed the dynastic parties unable to generate a cohesive 
Spanish national identity. For all the rhetoric of ‘revolution from above’ and national 
regeneration that followed the ‘Disaster’, electoral falsification and patronage continued 
to be the rule, hence hampering popular identification with the political system. 
Moreover, as the economy and society modernized, the system proved too rigid to absorb 
political opposition. True, Liberals were able to integrate into their party some members 
of Alejandro Lerroux’s Partido Republicano Radical (Radical Republican Party) and 
Mequiades Álvarez’s Partido Reformista (Reformist Party), while the Conservatives 
were happy to incorporate Catalan regionalists in their cabinets. Yet, on many occasions, 
the best alternative that the Restoration politicians found to confront political challenges 
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from below was to increase the already intense military intervention in social repression, 
which in turn led to a higher popular alienation from the political system. Crucially, the 
steady growth of a Socialist and Anarchist proletariat and Republican-leaning middle 
classes meant not only an increasing challenge to the political system but also the social 
expansion of alternative identities to the official idea of Spain promoted by the 
Restoration elites. 
 On the counterrevolutionary side, the idea of order was linked to the Spanish nation. 
In January 1919, Catalan regionalists of the Lliga, Spanish nationalists of the UMN and 
the Carlists joined forces and, with the support of the local financial elite, created the 
Barcelona Somatén, a civic guard (guardia cívica) under military supervision integrated 
in the general framework of the Catalan Somatén. Its declared aims were protecting 
property, fighting the alleged ‘Bolshevik’ menace, keeping order and maintaining 
factories and public services working during strikes. In effect, the setting up of the 
Barcelona Somatén meant the establishment of a bourgeois armed force funded by 
industrialists and organized by the military. Among the employers linked to this group, 
the Second Marquis of Comillas was to play the most relevant role. A staunch Catholic 
obsessed with endowing the counterrevolutionary citizens’ militias with a modern 
character according to the spirit of the times, the Marquis was a founding member of the 
Barcelona Somatén in January 1919. Nine months later he sponsored the creation of the 
militia Defensa Ciudadana in Madrid. By the end of 1919, employers’ organizations and 
other conservative groups had created civic guards in Madrid, Zaragoza, Valencia, 
Granada and Alicante following the Barcelona Somatén model. In the next two years, 
Palma de Mallorca, Sevilla and San Sebastian followed suit.61
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 Counterrevolutionary violence, however, had its limitations as a tool of national 
integration. The dynastic parties seem to have realized the importance of the symbolic 
order in the formation of a popular national identity. During the decades that preceded 
Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, the creation of national symbols was completed. It was 
then that Maura governments promoted the Marcha Real to the rank of national anthem 
(1908) and the national flag was made compulsory in every public building (1908). Again 
under Maura in 1918, 12 October, the ‘Day of the Race’ (Día de la Raza), was officially 
declared a national holiday in commemoration of the Discovery of America by 
Christopher Columbus. In this Day of the Race, local authorities organized multiple 
ceremonies all over Spain to pay homage to Columbus and the conquistadors.62 In 
Madrid, dozens of children paraded in front of the statue of Columbus, where they left 
bouquets of flowers. The king also attended the celebrations, in which politicians and 
South American ambassadors gave rather pompous speeches before the customary mass 
sanctified the Spanish nation and its glorious past.63 Additionally, the Spanish Right, the 
government and the media began a campaign to prove that Christopher Columbus was 
Spanish in an attempt to use him as a figure of Spanish national regeneration.64 The 
promotion of the ‘Day of the Race’ to the rank of official national holiday precisely in 
1918 has to be understood not only as a step further in the state’s endorsement of 
Hispanismo, but also as the attempt to promote political patriotism and nationalist 
exaltation in the context of the dramatic institutional crisis that Spain was suffering since 
1917.65 In other words, stirring nationalist feelings among the population was thought to 
be the internal panacea for a seriously sick political system. 
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 The Restoration also witnessed an upsurge of nationalist commemorations. Since 
the late 19th century celebrations of anniversaries of patriotic figures and deeds led to 
what has been called a ‘centenary craze’.66 The centenaries of the deaths of Pedro 
Calderón de la Barca (1881), Bartolomé Murillo (1882), the conversion to Christianity of 
the Visigoth king Recadero (1889), the Discovery of America (1892), the publication of 
the first part of Don Quixote (1905), the popular uprising against the Napoleonic troops 
(1908), different battles of the War of Independence, the Cádiz constitution (1912), the 
death of El Greco, the death of Miguel de Cervantes and the battle of Covadonga (1918), 
to mention the most significant, were commemorated in many Spanish cities.67 It is 
important to note that both Conservatives and Liberals equally fostered these patriotic 
celebrations when in government seeking to homogenize the population in nationalist 
values.68 At times, this led to the confrontation of Liberal and Conservative models of the 
Spanish nation at a symbolic level. For example, the commemoration of the 100th
anniversary of the 1808 and 1809 Napoleonic seizes of Zaragoza led to serious clashes 
between the Liberal and the Conservative versions of the Spanish nation and, 
consequently, to the celebration of multiple and competing patriotic events.69 During the 
construction of the Covadonga Sanctuary in Asturias, Liberals and Conservatives also 
fought to control the symbolic meaning of the site and, hence, its collective identity.70
However, from 1914 Liberal nationalism lost ground to its Conservative counterpart in 
the field of official commemorations. Those who described Spain as conterminous to 
Catholicism and talked about discipline and order steadily gained the support of the 
authorities. In the fields of commemorations, Conservative Spanish nationalism became 
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hegemonic in a clear reaction to what were perceived as revolutionary and separatist 
threats.71
 Additionally, as in the case of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany and Italy, 
the king played an incredibly active role in patriotic commemorations and ceremonies. 
Alfonso XIII was particularly keen to associate the crown with the patria and during his 
reign Spanish nationalism was often displayed in monarchical terms.72 Thus the king 
repeatedly took part in the celebrations of anniversaries of patriotic figures and events 
and granted money for the building of national monuments. For instance, only six years 
into his reign, Alfonso XIII bestowed 20,000 pesetas to the construction of the 
Covadonga Sanctuary.73 Other examples of the monarch’s involvement in nationalist 
ceremonies reached tragic-comic proportions. In 1921, he was presiding over the 
transportation of the remains of Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar, El Cid, in front of the relics of 
Saint Fernando, the medieval monarch that conquered vast areas of Andalusia from the 
Muslims, when the first news of the Annual Disaster in Morocco broke.74 The monarch’s 
celebration of the Christian nation forged during the reconquista had taken place literarily 
hours after Moroccan rebels had slaughtered thousands of Spanish soldiers, who had 
followed Alfonso XIII’s military strategy in the African protectorate. 
 Like many members of the Restoration elites, Alfonso XIII became increasingly 
conservative and counterrevolutionary. Crucially, from the First World War onwards, it is 
possible to talk about an authoritarian turn in the behaviour and discourses of the king.75
Extremely mindful of the Tsar’s fate in Russia, Alfonso XIII presented monarchy, nation, 
order and religion in the same ideological package. At a symbolic level, this nationalist 
and authoritarian turn was epitomized on Saint Fernando’s Day 1919. On 30 November 
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that year, Alfonso XIII personally consecrated the Spanish nation to the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus, at the Cerro de los Ángeles (Getafe) in an impressive and lavish ceremony.76 Many 
of the New Right’s ideas, that explosive cocktail of religion, nationalism and anti-
parliamentarianism mixed with important doses of revolutionary fear, were embraced by 
the monarch too. 
 As in France and Germany, the ‘monumentalist fever’ of the 1880s and 1890s was 
to rise in Spain from the turn of the century onwards.77 It was then that a group of artists 
connected to the Royal Academy of San Fernando built the monuments celebrating the 
nation’s dead heroes and portraying the crown as the symbolic personification of the 
fatherland, best examples of which were the sculpture of Eloy Gonzalo García, the so-
called ‘hero of Cascorro’ (Madrid, 1902), and the monumental complex to Alfonso XII in 
El Retiro Park (Madrid, 1902). By an official directive, the same artists were active in the 
provinces, where all sorts of ‘national’ fighters were commemorated, from the Celt-
Iberian resistance against the Romans (Numancia, 1905), through to the sixteenth-century 
imperial commander-in-chief El Gran Capitán (Córdoba, 1909), and the heroine of the 
‘War of Independence’ Agustina de Aragón (Zaragoza, 1908). All of them were 
manifestations of the process of creating from above a historical national identity that 
was gaining momentum precisely after the loss of the last colonies. These monuments, 
together with the ever-increasing construction of ‘national’ museums, libraries, theatres, 
and archives, created ‘sacred places’ in which the national history and culture were 
venerated. After the turn of the century, the whole process of ‘inventing traditions’ was 
set in full motion in Spain. By 1923, an official image of the nation, as perceived by the 
state-elites, had been consolidated.78 More importantly, the very fact that on numerous 
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occasions the commemoration of national deeds and the money to build monuments to 
the patriotic heroes came from public subscriptions demonstrates the existence of a 
widespread, inter-class, popular Spanish nationalism in the years that preceded the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. 
 It is worth emphasizing here that the creation of a national ‘civic religion’ from 
above, with its symbols, holidays and shrines, usually emerged with associations to 
Catholic symbols, rites and traditions. As mentioned above, religion was a pivotal 
element in the conservative canon of the nation and all sort of rightists maintained a 
strong identification between Catholicism and Spain. The 1876 Constitution declared 
Catholicism to be the official religion of Spain and Antonio Cánovas soon accommodated 
the Church within the Restoration establishment, which meant ecclesiastical 
representation at almost every single public event. Thus it was no coincidence that one of 
the most notorious public ceremonies during the reign of Alfonso XIII was the king’s 
consecration of the patria to the Sacred Heart of Jesus at El Cerro de los Ángeles. Neither 
was it by chance that some memorials commemorating the ‘War of Independence’ were 
considered monuments ‘to the martyrs of Religion and the Fatherland’ at the same time, 
such as the one inaugurated in Zaragoza in 1904.79 This overlapping of the national and 
Catholic symbolism became even more obvious with the creation of the Fiesta de la 
Raza, for 12 October coincided with the popular religious celebration of the Virgin Pilar, 
which had already gained a strong nationalist flavour during the 19th century.80 The 
Restoration establishment seems to have realized that representing and celebrating the 
nation intermingled with religion in a Catholic country was a good way to obtain popular 
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support for the official patriotic ideal, without having to pay the toll of a real 
democratization of the political system. 
 Not that the Church’s cooperation with the Restoration’s political elites came out of 
any charitable spirit. In the last decades of the 19th century, the Church agreed to provide 
its authority to the ‘civil religion’ that sanctified the social and political order of the 
Restoration, in exchange for the constitutional and legal protection of its ideological 
monopoly. In the early 20th century, as the democratic threat to the system grew, the 
ecclesiastical authorities became fully aware of the fact that they shared the goal of 
protecting the established social and political order with the Restoration political elites.81
When the Church felt the heat of secularization increasing then it reacted by orchestrating 
a vast mobilization using modern means. The Church organized a new series of Catholic 
leagues, press campaigns and street demonstrations to face the challenge posed by secular 
Liberals, anti-clerical Republicans, Socialists and Anarchists, especially after 1909.82  
 Again, there was no Spanish ‘exceptionalism’ in this phenomenon. Established 
Churches lent their sacred authority to governments in order to promote patriotic feelings 
all over Europe.83 This ‘sacralization’ of politics was in fact one of the by-products of 
secularization, which dramatically accelerated at the beginning of the twentieth century.84
In France, the secular policies of the Third Republic, led to virulent reaction by a New 
Right, which thought its clerical view of the nation was the real patrie and its reactionary 
agenda the only hope for regeneration.85 Likewise, in Spain the increasing secularization 
of society went together with the process of ‘sacralization’ of politics. Amid this struggle 
between clericals and anti-clericals, the former increasingly appealed to the nation, an 
entity that had been sanctified and now became the epitome of social order. 
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 The Church’s hierarchy realized the utility of embracing the myth of the nation and 
saw how it could be brought into play to ensure Catholic social mobilization. Thus Pope 
Leo XIII and the Spanish Church supported from its inception the celebration of the ‘Day 
of the Race’, which they interpreted as the remembrance of the successful 
Christianization of America.86 Another example of interwoven Catholic and nationalist 
sentiments were the popular pilgrimages to Rome, where the participants combined 
appeals to Catholic unity with prayers for the ‘salvation of Spain’.87 After all in the last 
quarter of the 19th century schools, congresses and associations under ecclesiastical 
control had been stressing imperial Spanish history as the hallmarks of national grandeur, 
following the works of Manuel Merri y Colón and Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo.88 This 
endeavour of popular indoctrination ultimately proves the Church found no contradiction 
in promoting simultaneously nationalist and Christian doctrines. In this sense, the process 
of ‘re-clericalization’ of Spanish society carried out by the Church in the early 20th
century was equivalent to the nationalization of Spaniards in Catholic values. 
 The two decades that followed the Disaster of 1898 definitively changed Spanish 
nationalism in terms of discourse and social scope. Ideologically, the conservative canon 
of Spain was reformulated. This new Spanish nationalism became increasingly martial, 
clerical, Pan-Hispanic and anti-liberal, and developed a deep hostility towards regional 
nationalisms and the organized working class. Political groups, intellectuals, the armed 
forces, conservative newspapers, and a plethora of organizations generally related to the 
Church constructed a new Spanish nationalism in a siege situation. The fact that these 
groups were unable to come together into a single party should not lead us to assume the 
absence of a Spanish political nationalism in the years that preceded Primo de Rivera’s 
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dictatorship. Indeed, most of the ideas that would eventually constitute the official ultra-
nationalist discourse of the primorriverista regime were first formulated during the last 
years of the Restoration. 
 The endurance and centrality of Catholicism as a key factor in the Right’s concept 
of nation and as an element of social and political mobilization during the crisis of the 
Restoration debunks the assumption that Catholicism was a handicap for the development 
of a modern nationalism. All the groups of the New Right emphasized Catholicism as the 
constituent element of Spanish nationality and gained popular support in those areas in 
which the social influence of the Church was strongest. Furthermore, in the process of 
mass nationalization, the state overlapped civic and religious symbols, holidays and 
ceremonies to create collective memories and loyalties, with the active collaboration of a 
Catholic Church integrated into the establishment. Catholicism, far from being 
incompatible with the development of a modern nationalism, was rather an appropriate 
ideological, discursive and symbolic element for the creation of a national identity and 
the mobilization of social support. Miguel Primo de Rivera, first, and Francisco Franco, 
later, would use this bond of nation and religion to reformulate the National-Catholic 
rhetoric that portrayed Spain as the antithesis of democracy. In both instances, the 
Catholic Church backed the military coups and the ensuing dictatorships. 
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